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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is a medical malpractice case involving allegations of malpractice and
lack of informed consent Plaintiffs Franz (the patient) and Betty Suhadolnik, (Appellants)
appeal the February 18, 2010 decision of the Honorable Judge Patrick Owen in which he
granted Scott Pressman M.D.'s (Respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment. 1
Respondents contend that the decision of the District Court should be affirmed in all
respects because the affidavit of Appellants' expert, John Hofbauer, M.D., demonstrates
that he failed to adequately familiarize himself with the local standard of health care
practice applicable to Dr. Pressman in Boise, Idaho, in 2006. Because Dr. Hofbauer's
affidavit failed to meet the admissibility requirements of Rule 56(e}, the District Court
properly concluded it was insufficient to create an issue of fact.

B.

Statement Of Facts.

On October 31, 2005, the patient, Franz Suhadolnik presented to Dr.
Pressman's office with complaints of worsening vision at which point a patient history was
obtained and documented by Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 131). The fact a health history was
obtained was confirmed by the patient in his deposition. (R. p. 33 [depo p. 49 to 52]). As
the timing of cataract surgery is often left to the patient when they feel their vision is getting
bad enough to warrant surgical intervention, the patient elected to defer undergoing
cataract surgery for several months. (R. p. 33 [depo p. 52 to 53]). The patient returned

1 It should be noted that Respondents' Brief is submitted on behalf of Defendants Dr. Scott
Pressman and The Eye Associates, P.A., both of whom were granted summary judgment as a result of
Judge Owen's decision which is at issue in this appeal.
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on May 30, 2006 at which point his preoperative exam was performed and a second
patient history was documented by Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 132, 141).
The following day, on May 31, 2006 the patient presented to the Eagle Eye
Surgery Center in Eagle where he underwent another documented health history followed
by cataract surgery on his right eye performed by Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 70, 142-144). The
purpose of this surgery was to remove the dense cataract from the patient's right eye and
replace it with an artificial lens which would allow him to see more clearly through his eye.
(R. p. 70). During the surgery, the zonular connections surrounding the patient's capsular

bag came loose which allowed the lens capsule to come out of position. (R. p. 155 [depo
p. 11 D. This complication resulted in the vitreous fluid contained within the posterior part
of the patient's eye to prolapse forward into the anterior chamber. Id. As a result, Dr.
Pressman was required to remove the prolapsed vitreous fluid and place an intraocular
lens in the anterior portion of the patient's eye instead of inside the capsular bag. (R. p.
144).

C.

Course Of Proceedings.

Dissatisfied with the outcome of his surgery, the patient and his wife
thereafter filed suit alleging malpractice and lack of informed consent. (R. p. 7). Counsel
for Dr. Pressman thereafter answered the complaint, engaged in discovery, and then filed
a motion for summary judgment. (R. p. 11-16).

This motion was supported by Dr.

Pressman's Affidavit which states, in part, that as a board certified ophthalmologist he
complied in all respects with the standard of health care practice applicable to him for the
time and place in question, Boise, Idaho, 2006, and that the care he provided was
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consistent with the care typically provided in the Boise, Idaho community in 2006. (R. p.
70).
Consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code § 39-4506, Dr. Pressman's
affidavit also states that he disclosed the pertinent medical facts to the patient such that
the patient was sufficiently aware of the need for, the nature of, and the significant risks
ordinarily involved in the medical treatment to be provided, including the fact that the
patient may need further surgery and the risk that he may experience injury to and/or loss
of the vision in his right eye. (R. p. 65-66, 114-5). Dr. Pressman's affidavit further states
that the requisite pertinent facts he disclosed to the patient prior to performing cataract
surgery represent those which would ordinarily be given by a like ophthalmologist and
cataract surgeon of good standing practicing in Boise in 2006. (R. p. 65-66, 114-5).
Plaintiffs opposed the defense motion with the Affidavit of Dr. John Hofbauer,
a Beverly Hills, California ophthalmologist. (R. p. 107 to 111). Dr. Hofbauer claimed to
have educated himself on the local standard of practice based on his experience and
training and based upon his review of the patient's medical records and the deposition of
Dr. Pressman. (R. p. 109). Following oral argument, on February 18, 2010, the District
Court concluded that Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit lacked foundation and thus the Plaintiffs'
showing was not adequate and granted Dr. Pressman's Motion for Summary Judgment as
to both counts of the complaint. (R. p. 182-195). No motion for reconsideration was ever
filed and the District Court entered a judgment in this matter in favor of the Defendants on
March 17, 2010. (R. p. 197-98). This appeal followed.
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II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.
Did the District Court err in concluding that by merely reviewing the
patient's medical records and the deposition of Dr. Pressman that the Appellants' expert,
Dr. Hofbauer, had failed to adequately familiarize himself with the local standard of health
care practice applicable to Dr. Pressman?
2.
Did the District Court err in concluding that Appellants failed to provide
evidence of any statewide minimum standards of practice applicable to Dr. Pressman
regarding what is required in order for an Idaho physician to obtain an adequate patient
history?

III.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.
Have Appellants waived the issue of informed consent contained
within Count II of their complaint by failing to provide any briefing or authority on this issue
in their opening brief?
2.
Are Respondents entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 due to the Appellants'
failure to identify any misapplication of the law and/or abuse of discretion by the District
Court?

IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Appel/ate Court's
standard of review is the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,871, 136 P.3d 338, 342
(2006); see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 225, 999 P.2d 877,
880 (2000); see also First Sec. Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,790,964 P.2d 654, 657
(1998). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law summary
judgment is proper." Id.
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Summary judgment is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is the
"principal tool ... by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and
prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and
private resources." Paugh v. Ottman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52281, *9-10 (D. Idaho 2008)
(quoting Ce/otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 377 (1986) (alterations in original)). In
evaluating the sufficiency of the materials submitted in opposition to summary judgment,
the Court must bear in mind the distinction between the requirements for admissibility of
expert opinion testimony under Rule 56(e) and the test for sufficiency of such testimony
in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The "admissibility of affidavits under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is a threshold question to be analyzed before applying
the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rules required when reviewing motions
for summary judgment." Edmunds at 871,136 P.3d 342. The Court must look at the
affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts, which taken as
true, would render the testimony admissible. Id. (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l

Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163,45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002)).
In order to determine whether the trial court erred in the granting of summary
judgment, it is first necessary to examine the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Edmunds,
142 Idaho at 872, 136 P.3d 343. Furthermore, "when reviewing the trial court's evidentiary
rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard."

Id.

"A district court's

evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed by this Court, unless there has been a clear abuse
of discretion." McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group -Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho
219,222, 159 P.3d 856,861 (2007). To determine whether the trial court has abused its
discretion, we consider whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether
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it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal
standards, and whether it reached its discretion by an exercise of reason." Shane v. Blair,
139 Idaho 126,128-129,75 P.3d 180,182-183 (2003) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr.

v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). See also Lamar
Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999)).

V.
ARGUMENT
A.

By Failing To Advance Any Argument Or Briefing On The Issue
Of Informed Consent, This Portion Of Appellants' Case Should
Be Deemed Waived.

Appellants' opening brief is entirely devoid of any argument or briefing
regarding: 1) the issue of lack of informed consent; 2) the adequacy of Dr. Hofbauer's
affidavit as to the issue of informed consent; and 3) whether with the District Court's erred
by granting the Respondents' motion for summary judgment as to Count II of the
Complaint. 2 A claim for lack of informed consent is a totally separate claim under Idaho
law from a claim for malpractice as set forth under Idaho Code § 39-4506, et seq.
Appellants' issues on appeal do not

refer to the issue of informed consent at all.

(Appellants' Brief p. 14). Respondents contend that given the failure to address this issue
by way of argument or briefing, that Appellants have either abandoned this issue on appeal
or should be deemed to have waived this issue on appeal based on the authorities set forth
below.

2 As the District Court found, there was nothing in the deposition testimony of Dr. Pressman
which provided a foundation for the informed consent opinions advanced in Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit. (R. p.
192). Dr. Pressman specifically stated in his deposition that he did not know what the standard of practice
was for advising patients regarding whether the use of Flomax increased a patient's risk of complications
during cataract surgery because the association between the two was inconclusive and only recently
reported. (R. p. 156 [depo p. 14-15]).
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Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) governs what is required of the Appellants'
Brief. The rule states: "The brief of the appellant shall contain the ... argument. The
argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and
parts of the transcript and records relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). This Court has made it
clear that it will not consider an issue which is "not supported by argument and authority
in the opening brief. ... [and] regardless of whether an issue is only mentioned in passing
and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this
Court."

Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho _ , __ , 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing

Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524,528,181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008»; Inama v. Boise
County ex rei. Bd. of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003».
This Court stated in Bach:
Where an appellant fails to assert his
assignments of error with particularity and to
support his position with sufficient authority,
those assignments of error are too indefinite to
be heard by the court. A genera! attack on the
findings and conclusions of the district court,
without specific reference to evidentiary or legal
errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. This
Court will not search the records on appeal for
error. Consequently, to the extent that an
assignment of error is not argued and supported
in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be
waived.
Bach, 229 P.3d 1146, 1154. (internal citations omitted).
In the absence of any argument or authority, the above precedent mandates
that the issue of informed consent, (including Count II of the Complaint) be deemed
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abandoned and/or waived for purposes of this appeal and therefore no longer part of this

B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
Concluded That Dr. Hofbauer's Affidavit Failed To Comply With
The Admissibility Requirements Of Rule 56(e) And Idaho Code §
6-1 013(c)(1).

"Admissibility of expert testimony requires personal knowledge." Shane v.

Blair, 139 Idaho 126,129,75 P.3d 180, 183 (2003). Appellants' expert, Dr. Hofbauer, is
an out of state expert. (R. p. 89). In order for his opinions as to the Defendant's alleged
failure to comply with the local standard of practice to be admissible, he was required to
demonstrate that he has actual and personal knowledge of the local standard of health
care practice applicable to Dr. Pressman as required by Rule 56(e) and Idaho Code § 61013(1 )(c). The question of admissibility of affidavits under Rule 56 (e) is a "threshold
question to be analyzed before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences
rules when reviewing motions for summary judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho
208,211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994).
Appellants cite numerous case authorities which discuss various ways in
which an out-of-area expert may familiarize himself with the local standard of practice.
(Appellants' Brief at p. 18-22). Respondents agree that this Court has identified and
discussed over the years several methods by which an out-of-area expert can accomplish
this pivotal foundational task. However, Respondents contend that the authorities relied

3 Respondents object to the data contained within footnote 2 of the Appellants' Brief
regarding an alleged Dear Doctor Letter from the FDA and ask that it be stricken and/or not considered by
this Court. This document and/or letter is not part of the record on appeal, it was not before the District
Court, and it should not be considered for any purpose as part of this appellate proceeding.
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on by Appellants do not at all support or approve the manner and method by which Dr.
Hofbauer attempted to familiarize himself with the local standard of practice in this case.
It is well settled that experts testifying as to the standard of practice in
medical malpractice actions must show that they have familiarized themselves with the
standard for a particular profession for the relevant community and time. Perry v. Magic

Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,51,995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000) (citing Kolin v. St.
Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 331, 940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997)). They must
also state how they became familiar with the standard of practice for the particular health
care professional.

Id.

"The witness must demonstrate a knowledge acquired from

experience or study of the standards of the speciality of the defendant physician sufficient
to enable him to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the defendant's conduct to
those particular standards .... " Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160,
168,45 P.3d 816, 824 (2002).
A common and approved means for an out-of-area expert to obtain
knowledge of the local standard of care is by inquiring of a local specialist. Perry v. Magic

Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000) (citing Watts v. Lynn,
125 Idaho 341,347,870 P.2d 1300, 1306 (1994)). As observed by this Court in Grover

v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105 (2002):
Although these cases do not provide a clear-cut
set of rules on what an out-of-state expert must
do to become familiar with the local standard of
care, these cases demonstrate that this Court
has been willing to affirm a district court's grant
of summary judgment on this basis when the
plaintiff's expert failed to contact any local
physician.
Likewise, the Court has been
reluctant to grant a defendant's motion for
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summary judgment when the plaintiffs expert did
not consult a local physician possessing
expertise on the area at issue.
Grover, 137 Idaho at 250, 46 P.3d at 1108. (citing Keyserv. Garner, 129 Idaho 112,117,
922 P.2d 409, 414 (Ct. App. 1996)). With this precedent as background, Dr. Hofbauer's
affidavit contains the following conclusory statement:
I have knowledge of the standard of care as it
existed in Boise, Idaho, during May of 2006 as it
related to the provision of medical care to Franz
Suhadolnik by Dr. Pressman. My knowledge
comes from my experience and training, as well
as from the testimony provided by Dr. Pressman
in his deposition and of the medical records of
Franz Suhadolnik. (R. p.108-109).
The District Court concluded there was a lack of foundation for Dr. Hofbauer's
opinions based on what he did to try and obtain actual knowledge of the local standard of
practice. (R. p. 189-193). Respondents' contend that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion by ruling that the contents of Dr. Pressman's 59 page deposition were
insufficient as a matter of law to provide Dr. Hofbauer with the requisite "actual knowledge"
of the local community standard of practice necessary to meet the admissibility
requirements of Rule 56(e). This Rule provides:
Form of Affidavits - Further Testimony - Defense
Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence. and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein.
I.R.C.P. 56(e). (emphasis added). See also Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr.,
137 Idaho 160,164,45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 212,

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 10

868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994). In addition to the requirements of Rule 56(e), Idaho Code

§ 6-1013 provides in pertinent part:
The applicable standard of practice and such a
defendant's failure to meet such standard must
be established in such cases by such a plaintiff
by testimony of one (1) or more knowledgeable,
competent expert witnesses, and such expert
testimony may only be admitted in evidence if
the foundation therefore is first laid ...
Idaho Code § 6-1013. (emphasis added).
To be admissible under Rule 56(e) and Idaho Code § 6-1013, Plaintiffs are
required to state within the body of Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit precisely how he became
familiar with the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Pressman. See Perry v. Magic

Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000); Hayward v. Jack's Pharm.,
Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 626 (2005). Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit demonstrates the following
undisputed facts: First, he is an ophthalmologist and therefore of the same specialty as Dr.
Pressman. Second, he is not an Idaho physician, but rather an out-of-area expert in
private practice in Beverly Hills, California. Third, there is no evidence that he ever
practiced medicine in Idaho. Fourth, there is no evidence that he ever: a) discussed the
patient's care with any physician from Boise; b) discussed local standards of practice
applicable to Dr. Pressman with any physician who practiced in Boise during the time and
place in question, namely 2006; or c) discussed with any local Boise physician whether
there were any differences between the local standard and any so-called national standard
of practice. Fifth, Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit states that the entire basis for his knowledge
regarding the local standard of practice comes solely from his review of Dr. Pressman's
deposition and the medical records in this case. (R. p. 108-109).
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This Court previously held that an expert cannot become familiar with the
local standard of practice merely by reviewing hospital records and the actions of a local
physician. See Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294,297-98,815 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1991).
This leaves Dr. Hofbauer's review of Dr. Pressman's deposition as the only remaining way
by which Appellants' out-of-area expert could have acquired actual knowledge of the
applicable standards of practice.

Respondents agree that reviewing an appropriate

deposition is one method this Court has authorized as a way of imparting actual knowledge
of the local standard of practice to an out-of-area expert. However, the feasibility of this
option obviously depends entirely on what testimony is contained within that deposition.
This Court stated in Groverv. Smith, 137 Idaho 247,251 (2002): "An out-ofstate expert can become familiar with the local standard of care by inquiring of a local
specialist or by "review of a deposition stating that the local standard does not vary from
the national standard! coupled with the expert's personal knowledge of the national
standard." (Quoting Perryv. Magic Valley Reg 'I Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,51-52,995 P.2d
816,821-22 (2000)). (emphasis added). In this case, the District Court properly concluded
that the contents of Dr. Pressman's deposition did not provide Dr. Hofbauer with the
information required to lay a foundation for his opinion that he has actual knowledge of the
local standard of practice. Notably absent from Dr. Pressman's deposition is any inquiry
by Appellants' counsel regarding whether there is any national standard of practice
applicable in this case and if so, what it required. Such a line of inquiry was deemed by
this Court in both Grover and Perry to be critical in order to impart actual knowledge to the
out-of-area expert.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 12

Nowhere in Dr. Pressman's deposition does he state that the local Boise
standard of practice for an ophthalmologist in 2006 was the same as any alleged
standard of practice

nor was he even asked by opposing counsel whether there was a

national standard of practice applicable to him. Instead, Dr. Hofbauer relies totally upon
what can only be described as a few generic and nonspecific questions posed in
Pressman's deposition. For example, Dr. Pressman agreed that the standard of practice
requires him to know how to perform cataract surgery, it requires him to keep current on
medical literature in the field and it requires him to take an adequate patient history. (R. p.
154-55). From such basic and conclusory statements, Plaintiffs jump to the conclusion that
Dr. Hofbauer has actual knowledge of the local standard of practice applicable to Dr.
Pressman.
The District Court properly disagreed. There is nothing in Dr. Pressman's
deposition that discusses what the local standard of practice required of him in 2006 in
order to know how to properly perform cataract surgery. Similarly, there is nothing in Dr.
Pressman's deposition which discusses what he was required to do as an ophthalmologist
in Boise in 2006 in order to keep current on medical literature in his field. Furthermore,
nothing in Dr. Pressman's deposition discusses what is required of ophthalmologists
practicing in Boise in 2006 in order to obtain an "adequate" patient history. Finally, nothing
in Dr. Pressman's deposition says the standard of practice required him to do something
other than what he did in this case with respect to the issue of informed consent. 4 As a
result, the District Court correctly concluded there was a complete lack of foundation for

4 In fact, regarding the issue of consent, in his deposition Dr. Pressman specifically stated
that the standard of practice applicable to him in 2006 did not require him to disclose to his patients
medication Flomax carried with it any increased risk of complications. (R. p. 166 [depo p. 55, II. 5-9]).
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Dr. Hofbauer's opinion that he has actual knowledge of the local standard of practice
applicable to Dr. Pressman.
Appellants rely upon the case of Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828
P.2d 854 (1992) to support their appeal. Kozlowski involved the admissibility of expert
testimony at trial. In Kozlowski, however, the plaintiff's out-of-state expert reviewed a
deposition in which a local specialist testified that the local standard was NO different than
the national standard. Id. 121 Idaho at 829,828 P.2d at 858. Under that circumstance, this
Court found that the plaintiff's expert was sufficiently familiar with the local standard of
practice and that the trial court erred by not allowing his testimony at trial. Id. at 830,828
P.2d at 859. No such testimony can be found in the deposition of Dr. Pressman upon
which Dr. Hofbauer relies for his foundation.
Instead, this case is more analogous to the facts presented in Rhodehouse
v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224 (1994). In Rhodehouse, the plaintiff in a medical

malpractice case argued that his out-of-area expert, Dr. Jenkins, became sufficiently
familiar with the local standard of practice through his review of the deposition of the
defendant physician, Dr. Stutts, and his review of the radiology films and hospital records.
125 Idaho at 212,868 P.2d at 1228. Unlike the physician in Kozlowski, Dr. Stutts NEVER
stated in his deposition that the local standard of practice was the same as any so-called
national standard, nor was there any allegation that Dr. Stutts made any direct reference
to the local standard of practice which would impart the knowledge necessary to lay the
foundation for the plaintiff's expert's opinions.
Consistent with this Court's holding in Rhodehouse, Dr. Pressman's
deposition similarly does not state that the local standard of practice is or was the same
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as any national standard. Because Dr. Hofbauer has otherwise failed to obtain actual
knowledge of the local standard of practice applicable to Dr. Pressman in 2006, there is
no foundation for his opinions. Instead, all we are left with is the conclusory statement by
Dr. Hofbauer which fails to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e). The ineffectiveness of
such conclusory statements was previously discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214,775 P.2d 106 (1989):
Thus, an expert from outside the state must
demonstrate that he possesses knowledge of
the local community standard. If he is board
certified in the same specialty, he must, at a
minimum, inquire of a local specialist to
determine whether the local community standard
varies from the national standard for that board
certified specialty. Totally insufficient are
statements such as Dr. Hall's naked assertion
that because he is familiar with the national
standard of care he is also "familiar with
what is expected of a board certified
orthopedic surgeon in Boise." Dr. Hall's
affidavits show no effort to obtain
information regarding the local standard of
care and, as the trial court noted, are
"conclusory statements which are incapable
of objective evaluation by anyone . . . ."
Consequently, there was no showing of a
genuine issue of fact which must be tried. The
trial court did not err in entering summary
judgment for Dr. Lenzi.
Strode, 116 Idaho at 216. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also, McDaniel v.
Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, L.L.C., 144 Idaho 219, 223 (2007) (stating
that at a minimum, an out-of-state expert making such a claim is required to "inquire of a
local specialist to determine whether the local community standard varies from the national
standard."); Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d
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816 (2002) (the out-of-state expert's opinion lacked foundation where he had talked with
a Boise physician practicing internal medicine but there was no showing that the Boise
physician would know the standard of care for emergency room physicians in Boise).
Under the facts of this case, the conclusory statements by Dr. Hofbauer are
similarly "incapable of objective evaluation by anyone" and therefore insufficient to render
his affidavit admissible under Rule 56(e). Strode, 116 Idaho at 216,775 P.2d at 108. As
a result, the Appellants failed to create an issue of fact regarding their claim that Dr.
Pressman violated the standard of practice and the District Court properly granted the
defense motion for summary judgment.

c.

Appellants Have Produced No Evidence Of There Being Any
Statewide Minimum Standard of Practice As To What Is Required
Of An Ophthalmologist Like Dr. Pressman In Order to Obtain An
"Adequate" Patient History.

Appellants also rely on the case of Groverv. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d
1105 (2002), to support their argument that Dr. Pressman's deposition testimony provided
Dr. Hofbauer with a sufficient foundation.

The allegations in Grover, however, are

substantially factually dissimilar to the case at bar. Grover involved a medical malpractice
claim against Dr. Smith, a Fruitland, Idaho general dentist. Id. 137 Idaho at 248,46 P.3d
at 1106.

The patient was prescribed pain killers by Dr. Smith over the phone for

complaints of pain located above her right temple. Without ever examining the patient and
without ever taking any patient history of any kind, Dr. Smith diagnosed the pain as being
part of a continuing pain the patient had experienced with her upper left teeth. Id.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
finding the Plaintiffs expert affidavits to be deficient in foundation. Id. 137 Idaho at 249,
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46 P.3d at 1107. On appeal, this Court focused on the sufficiency of the affidavits filed by
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Thurmond, an out-of-area expert who was also a professor of
dentistry at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska. As part of his affidavit testimony,
Dr. Thurmond indicated that he had spoken to other Idaho dentists regarding the standards
of practice applicable to the defendant in Fruitland during the time in question and that he
was also aware of the minimum training requirements placed on dentists in order to
become licensed in Idaho due to the relationship between Idaho State University and
Creighton University where he taught and his experience observing the administering of
the Idaho State Dental Board Examination. Id. at 251-52,46 P.3d 1109-10.
One of the allegations in Grover was that Dr. Smith had failed to take a
patient history before arriving at a diagnosis and administering pain medication for a tooth
ache when the patient was actually experiencing the precursors to what became a severe
stroke.

Dr. Thurmond opined that taking a health history of a patient was a basic,

elementary standard required by all dentists in Idaho. Id. at 252,46 P.3d at 1110. This
Court considered the fact that under Idaho Code §§ 54-901 through 54-934, the state of
Idaho had adopted national standards of care as set forth in the Idaho Dental Practices
Act. Id. at 250, 46 P.3d at 1108. This Court concluded that because taking a patient
history represented a basic requirement applicable to all dentists in Idaho pursuant to
Idaho Board of Dentistry, and as set forth as part of the factual basis for the opinions in Dr.
Thurmond's affidavits, that the local standard of practice could not be less than this
statewide minimum standard. Id. at 252, 46 P.3d at 1110.
The Grover decision is distinguishable from the case at bar because there
was evidence before the court of a statewide minimum standard of practice that dentists
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were required to take a patient history. In this case, there is no evidence in the record of
any statewide minimum standard for ophthalmologists regarding the nature or adequacy
of the patient medical history they are required to obtain in order to practice medicine in
Idaho. Furthermore, unlike Dr. Thurmond who indicated he spoke with numerous Idaho
dentists, it is undisputed that Dr. Hofbauer made no effort to talk to any ophthalmologist
in Idaho or anywhere else about anything in this case. Moreover, there is undisputed
evidence in the record before this Court, as set out in the above statement of facts, that
this patient's medical history was, in fact, taken on at least three occasions before his
cataract surgery took place. See supra pp. 2-3. Finally, a critical distinguishable fact exists
between the Grover case and the case at bar: the opinion of Dr. Hofbauer is not that Dr.
Pressman violated the standard of practice by failing to take ANY patient history (as was
opined by Dr. Thurmond in Grover), but rather that Dr. Pressman violated the standard of
practice by failing to take an ADEQUATE patient history. (R. p. 109).
Appellants also rely on this Court's decision in Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy

Inc., 141 Idaho 622,115 P.3d 713 (2005) for the proposition that a defendant physician
cannot adopt a standard of practice lower than any standard that may be imposed at the
facility where the patient was treated. (Appellants' Brief, pp.22-23). Hayward involved a
medical malpractice suit against a defendant physician, who, simUltaneous to his role as
a physician, also acted as medical director in a nursing home facility where the plaintiffs
father was cared for. Id., 141 Idaho 622, 115 P.3d 713. This Court discussed how "in
cases where state or federal laws or regulations set forth minimum requirements for
licensure of health care providers, that local communities may not adopt lower standards.

Id. at 628, 115 P.3d 719.

Respondents maintain that the Hayward decision is not
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applicable as there are no state or federal laws or regulations before this Court or which
Appellants' expert asserts operate to set any minimum standards of practice applicable to
Dr. Pressman. Absent any such standards, then the standard to which Dr. Pressman is
to be judged is "... in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same
class in the same community, taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields
of medical specialization, if any ... " as set forth under Idaho Code § 6-1012.
Appellants contention that the standard of practice is not what is usually done
in a given community only applies in the unique situation where what the health care
provider contends is the local standard of practice is deemed to be a lesser standard than
an applicable statewide standard or applicable state or federal law or regulation. See
Grover and Hayward, supra. Otherwise, it is well settled by this Court that "the standard
of [practice] is simply the care typically provided under similar circumstances by the
relevant type of health care provider in the community at the time and place of the alleged
negligent act." Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126,130,75 P.3d 180,184 (2003). (emphasis
added).
Appellants also suggest that the failure of Dr. Pressman to take an adequate
patient history would result in a failure of some unidentified licensing requirement.
(Appellants' Brief p. 25). Respondents object to the Appellants' references to alleged
standards and/or regulations which are not part of the record on appeal and which were
not submitted for consideration to the District Court. Furthermore, there is no explanation
in Appellants' briefing before this Court as to what these alleged standards and regulations
are or how Dr. Pressman's conduct in this case in any way violated them based on the
nature of the patient history he obtained.
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There is nothing in Dr. Pressman's affidavit or deposition, nor the affidavit of
Dr. Hofbauer, which in any way suggests or implies the existence of any statewide
requirement as to what must be contained within a patient history for an ophthalmologist
in order for it to be deemed "adequate." Again, Appellants' argument on this issue appears
irrelevant and seems to miss the point since the motion for summary judgment was lost on
foundational grounds, not whether there was evidence that the standard of practice was
breached.
D.

What The Standard Of Practice Is In A Given Case Does Not
Represent A Question Of Fact For The Jury Unless And Until The
Admissibility Requirements Of Rule 56(e) Have Been Met.

Appellants contend that the District Court erred by not ruling that the issue
of what the standard of practice is in this malpractice case should be deemed a question
of fact for a jury. (Appellants' Brief pp. 24-25). In support of this theory, Appellants rely
upon the malpractice case of Grimes v. Green, 113 Idaho 519, 746 P.2d 978 (1987).
Appellants' reliance on this decision is unclear. The sole issue before this Court in Grimes
appears to have been "whether during the trial of a medical malpractice action, the trial
court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant's treatment of plaintiff should be
gauged and measured by the standard of health care of the community rather than a
national standard of health care." Id., 113 Idaho at 519,746 P.2d at 978. The defendant
physician in Grimes obtained a defense verdict after which the District Court granted the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the grounds that it had wrongly instructed the jury as to
the standard of practice based on the newly issued decision in Buck v. St. Clair, 108
Idaho 743, 702 P.2d 781 (1985).
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This Court concluded that the district court had

misapplied the Buck decision and reinstated the defense verdict. Grimes, 113 Idaho at
520,746 P.2d at 979.
Respondents contend that the narrow and unrelated jury instruction issue
addressed by this Court in Grimes is wholly irrelevant to whether the District Court abused
its discretion in determining that Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit was foundationally inadequate and
therefore inadmissible in this case. The adequacy of a jury instruction comes long after
it has been determined whether the testifying experts have an adequate foundation for
their opinions. It is the role of the District Court as the gatekeeper to determine whether
an adequate foundation exists such that the expert's testimony should be allowed in. See
Foster v. Trau/, 145 Idaho 24, 28, 175 P.3d 186, 190 (2007). In this case, the District
Court properly concluded that Dr. Hofbauer's opinions were not supported with an
adequate foundation in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e) and Idaho
Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. As outlined above, the question of admissibility of affidavits
under Rule 56(e) is a "threshold question to be analyzed before applying the liberal
construction and reasonable inferences rules when reviewing motions for summary
judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224,1227 (1994).
Once deemed foundationally inadequate, there is nothing to present to a jury and the
Grimes decision has no bearing on this issue.
E.

The District Court Properly Determined And Analyzed The
Burden Of Each Party At The Summary Judgment Stage In This
Medical Malpractice Case.

Appellants misinterpret the requirements set forth in Idaho Code §§ 6-1012
and 6-1013 at the summary judgment stage. Appellants state the following in their brief:
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At summary judgment, the factors set forth in
Idaho Code § 6-1012 merely act as elements of
the plaintiff's cause of action and the analysis
therefore is whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to any element challenged by the
defendant. In this instance Defendant Pressman
challenged Plaintiffs' ability to prove a breach of
the local community standard of care."
(Appel/ants' Br., pp.17-18).
Respondents disagree that their motion for summary judgment merely challenged Plaintiffs'
ability to prove a breach of the local standard. The express intent of the defense motion
for summary judgment was to determine whether the Plaintiffs had a qualified expert who
could meet the requirements of Rule 56 (e) and Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. (R. p.
68-82). This is what the District Court considered and found to be lacking. (R. p. 182-196).
Appellants were unable to advance beyond the initial inquiry of Rule 56(e) once the District
Court determined Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit was inadequate. This Court has made it clear,
that "the admissibility of the expert's testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct from
whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
preclude summary judgment." Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160,
163,45 P.3d 816,819 (2002).
While Appellants are correct that "the non-moving party is not required to
respond to any element not addressed by the moving party at summary judgment," the
Appellants misconstrue the burden placed on them by Rule 56 (e) and Idaho Code §§ 61012 and 6-1013. Although the Appellants are not required to respond to an unaddressed
element, they are required to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e), which represents
the District Court's obligated threshold inquiry "to be answered before applying the liberal
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construction and reasonable inferences rule to the admissible evidence." Dunlap v.

Garner, 127 Idaho 599,605,903 P.2d 1296, 1302 (1994).5
F.

The District Court Did Not Weigh The Evidence In Favor Of
Respondents In Granting Summary Judgment.

Respondents agree with Appellants that the District Court is generally not to
weigh the strength or quality of the evidence submitted by the parties at the summary
judgment stage. Respondents further agree that had there been a proper foundation for
the opinions of Dr. Hofbauer, (such that his affidavit testimony would have been
admissible), that his affidavit would otherwise have potentially raised multiple issues offact.
However, because there was not an adequate foundation for the opinions of Dr. Hofbauer
showing that he had actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice
applicable to Dr. Pressman in Boise in 2006, Respondents disagree that the District Court
in any way engaged in weighing the evidence or otherwise interfered with an issue which
should have been properly left for a jury.
Appellants provide no specific references to any evidence in the record
suggesting that the District Court made any credibility determinations. (Appellants' Brief,
pp. 26-27). Instead, Appellants suggest that Dr. Pressman made inconsistent statements
between his affidavit and his deposition and that the District Court improperly granted a
favorable inference regarding this issue to the nonmoving party. (Appellants' Brief, p. 27).

5 Furthermore, the two cases Appellants cite for the above proposition that "the non-mOVing
party is not required to respond to any element not addressed by the moving party at summary judgment"
are not medical malpractice cases and are therefore factually distinguishable. See Idaho Schools for Equal
Educational Opportunity v. State of Idaho, 132 Idaho 559, 976 P.2d 913 (1998) (involving questions
surrounding public school funding pursuant to the Idaho Constitution); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130
Idaho 597, 600, 944 P.2d 1360 (1997) (involving a personal injury claim arising out of electrocution following
power termination).
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Respondents disagree. The affidavit of Dr. Hofbauer states that the foundation for his
opinions is based solely on his review of Dr. Pressman's deposition and of the Plaintiff's
medical records. (R. p. 107-112). There is no mention in Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit that he
relied or even reviewed Dr. Pressman's affidavit. Id. Thus, there was no reason for the
District Court to get into this issue because Appellants never provided Dr. Hofbauer with
the allegedly conflicting affidavit of Dr. Pressman. 6
This was specifically addressed by the District Court at oral argument on the
motion for summary judgment:
Mr. Whitehead: . . . . And so now we have
competing affidavits about is it an adequate
history if you don't ask about a drug that a
patient's been on that's known in the industry to
increase the risk of cataract surgery.
The Court: What am I to make of the doctor's
statements on page 14 and into 15? It's one
thing where I understand it's a general standard
of care to take the history. But on page 14 and
15 he says, "I'm not aware of what the standard
of practice in the community was for that
particular drug at that particular time." How is it
that your expert can form an opinion based on
that?
Mr. Whitehead: In 14 or 15 of his deposition,
Your Honor?

6 Respondents contend that Dr. Pressman did not contradict his deposition testimony by his
subsequent Affidavit. The deposition question posed to Dr. Pressman focused on whether it was the
standard of practice to disclose to a patient that the drug Flomax carried with it increased potential risk of
complications during cataract surgery. (R. pp. 154-155). Dr. Pressman testified that the standard of practice
did not require him to do this. Id. Subsequently, in his Affidavit, Dr. Pressman stated that he had knowledge
of the risks and benefits of cataract surgery, including the risks associated with the drug commonly known
as Flomax and that the standard of practice did not require that he ask or consent his patients on this drug
because it did not amount to a material or significant risk of cataract surgery. (R. p. 64-66). Nothing in Dr.
Pressman's Affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony.
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The Court: Of his deposition, yeah.
My
understanding is that your retained expert relied
on the doctor's deposition in coming to his
opinion about what the local standard of care
was.
Mr. Whitehead: Yes.
The Court: And this is a portion of the deposition
which, as I read it, the treating physician says I
don't know what the local standard of care was
relating to Flomax at that time.
Mr. Whitehead: Well, he says something
opposite in his affidavit. I mean, I'll give the guy
enough credit that he can fish on us. He's the
defendant in this case. Contradictory statements

The Court: Except that your expert says that his
opinion -- the foundation for his opinion is based
on these deposition statements.
(Tr. p. 11, II. 9-25 to p. 12, II. 1-13).
Counsel for the Appellants did not dispute before the District Court that his
expert had only relied upon Dr. Pressman's deposition regarding his attempts to learn
about the local standard of practice. Appellants did not ever seek to supplement or
otherwise supply the District Court with any additional affidavits of Dr. Hofbauer indicating
that he had now reviewed the affidavit of Dr. Pressman as well, nor does the record reflect
that Appellants took any action to try and remedy the defects in the foundation relating to
Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit by way of a motion for reconsideration. Similarly, Appellants did
not request leave of the District Court by way of Rule 56(f) in an attempt to try and resolve
the obvious foundational concern raised by the District Court at oral argument.
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Appellants rely upon the case of Watts

Vo

Lynn, 125 Idaho 341,870 P.2d

1300 (1994) to sustain their evidence weighing argument. In Watts, another malpractice
case, the trial court was presented with various expert affidavits in support of, and in
opposition to, the defendant physician's motion for summary judgment. Ido 125 Idaho at
346, 870 P.2d at 1305. The plaintiffs expert, Dr. Cohen, submitted an affidavit in which
he stated he learned about the standard of practice based on information received from
another dentist, Dr. Branz. Ido The defendant then obtained an affidavit from Dr. Branz,
in which he disputed much of the foundational information contained within Dr. Cohen's
affidavit that the defendant had violated the standard of practice. Ido at 344, 870 P.2d at
1303.
Faced with these competing affidavits, the trial court elected to reject Dr.
Cohen's affidavit based on the statements contained within Dr. Branz's affidavit. Id. This
Court understandably reversed, holding that "by rejecting Dr. Cohen's affidavit, the trial
court erroneously involved itself in weighing conflicting evidence rather than determining
whether, for the purposes of summary judgment, [the plaintiff] had offered sufficient
evidence." Ido The Court further noted "that the trial court found Dr. Branz' affidavit more
truthful or convincing involves issues of weighing facts, which are not to be considered as
the basis for a grant of summary judgment." Ido
The actions of the District Court in the case at bar evidence that it did not
weigh the facts nor the quality or quantity of the evidence submitted. There is no evidence
that the District Court ever engaged in any credibility determinations as between Dr.
Hofbauer and Dr. Pressman. Instead, the District Court properly focused its attention on
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determining whether the submissions of the parties complied with the foundational
requirements of Rule 56(e) - which the Appellants did not.
G.

Respondents Are Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal Pursuant
To Idaho Code § 12-121 And I.A.R. 41(a).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) governs the award of attorney fees.
It states:
In any civil action the court may award
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion
of the court may include paralegal fees, to the
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule
54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section
12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the
court only when it finds, from the facts presented
to it, that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be
awarded pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho
Code, on a default judgment.
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) 'creates no substantive right to attorney fees, but
merely establishes a framework for applying I.C. § 12-121.'" Newberryv. Martens, 142
Idaho 284,292,127 P.2d 187,195 (2005) (citing Huffv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274,277 n.1, 647
P.2d 730, 733 n.1 (1982)).
According to the Idaho Supreme Court:
Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under
that statute [Idaho Code § 12-121] only if this
Court is left with the abiding belief that the
appeal was brought or pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation. Where
an appeal turns on the question of law, an
award of attorney fees under this section is
proper if the law is well settled and the
appellant has made no substantial showing
that the district court misapplied the law.
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Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 729, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001). (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
Respondents contend that the case authority interpreting Rule 56(e) and
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 specifically discuss the steps an out-of-area expert
must take in order to sufficiently familiarize himself or herself with the local standard of
practice. The actions of Dr. Hofbauer, relying solely on Dr. Pressman's deposition in order
to familiarize himself, resulted in a foundationally defective affidavit despite the presence
of well-established Idaho case authorities regarding summary judgment in medical
malpractice cases. Based on the record before the Court, Respondents contend the
Appellants have unreasonably pursued this appeal and have failed to establish a credible
misapplication of the law by the District Court. In light of the substantial expenses incurred
as a result of this undertaking, Respondents respectfully request that they be awarded
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41(a).

v.
CONCLUSION
The District Court properly concluded that Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit failed to
comply with the threshold foundational requirements set forth under Rule 56(e). Dr.
Hofbauer is an out-of-area physician. His affidavit states he relied upon the deposition
testimony of the Defendant physician to learn about the local standard of practice. This
deposition did not set forth the required information which the District Court properly
concluded prevented Dr. Hofbauer's affidavit from being admissible. The District Court
properly granted the Respondents' motion for summary judgment and the Respondents
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respectfully request this Court affirm the District Court's decision in all respects and that
the Respondents be awarded costs and attorney fees for defending against this appeal.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2010.
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